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WATER POLLUTION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
By
RALPH W. JOHNSON*
Nonpoint pollution from irrigation return flows has become a seri-
ous national problem. Even the extraction of water for irrigation
and other purposes causes pollution by reducing the assimilative
capacity of the source stream or lake. Such pollution can be regu-
lated either by the courts or the legislatures under the public
trust doctrine, which antedates the prior appropriation system,
and which protects fisheries and water quality. Alternatively, this
pollution can be controlled under the state's police powers. The
"takings" issue should not be troublesome because no one, not
even prior appropriators, has or can acquire a legal right to pol-
lute public waters.
I. INTRODUCTION
By some estimates, nonpoint' water pollution sources ac-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. B.S. 1947,
LL.B. 1949, University of Oregon. Law students Betsy Dennis and Donnie Wil-
burn provided valuable research assistance. The author wishes to acknowledge re-
ceipt of a summer research grant from the University of Washington School of
Law which aided in the writing of this Article. An earlier version of this Article, in
which the author's analysis was only partially developed, was published as John-
son, The Emerging Recognition of a Public Interest in Water: Water Quality
Control by the Public Trust Doctrine in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 127 (D.
Getches ed. 1988). David H. Getches and William H. Rodgers, Jr., kindly offered
criticisms of drafts, but the author alone is to blame for the words on these pages.
1. Nonpoint sources of water pollution are all sources that are not point
sources. See 2 W. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 146 (3d ed. 1986). A point
source is defined in the Clean Water Act as "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit,
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding opera-
tion, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be dis-
charged." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (West Supp. 1988). Return flows from irrigated
agriculture and agricultural storm water discharges are specifically excluded. Id.
Irrigated agriculture, highways, subdivisions, and logging all cause nonpoint pollu-
tion. In other words, there is no specific end-of-the-pipe or other point source that
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
count for up to ninety-nine percent of suspended solids and be-
tween fifty to ninety percent of other conventional pollutants.2
Up to fifty percent of toxic pollutants may be blamed on
nonpoint sources.' Nonpoint pollution is primarily responsible for
the failure in most states to meet the Clean Water Act's water
quality standards."
Agriculture is a major source of nonpoint pollution in the
form of sediments, pesticides, and pathogens.' Fifty percent of
the total sediments contaminating United States inland water-
ways began as cropland, and half of this, along with organic and
inorganic contaminants, reaches the oceans.6 The drinking water
of an estimated fifty million people in the United States comes
from groundwater that is potentially contaminated with agricul-
tural chemicals.' Risks to human health from exposure to con-
taminated groundwater have been documented, and more are
suspected.'
Several trends have increased the potential for groundwater
contamination from agriculture. Four times more inorganic nitro-
gen fertilizers, a major source of nitrate-nitrogen groundwater
contamination, were used in 1980 than were used in 1960, while
the agricultural use of pesticides has nearly tripled since 1964."
Meanwhile, up to ninety-seven percent of people in rural areas
rely on groundwater for their drinking water."0
The prior appropriation system of the Western United States
was not designed to control this type of nonpoint pollution. Not
surprisingly, this failure has led to a search for other legal solu-
discharges waste. Instead, pollutants seep down through the soil into groundwater
aquifers, or gravitate into rivers with return flows from irrigation or forestry
practices.
2. 2 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 1, at 124-25.
3. Id. at 125.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 139; see also 2 J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213 (1986).
6. 2 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 1, at 139.
7. E. NIELSEN & L. LEE, THE MAGNITUDE AND COSTS OF GROUNDWATER CON-
TAMINATION FROM AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS vi (1987).
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 1; FRESHWATER FOUNDATION, AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS AND
GROUNDWATER PROTECTION: SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION AND Ac-
TION 1 (1987).
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tions, such as the Clean Water Act (which to date has also failed),
and a rejuvenated and enhanced public trust doctrine."
The battle lines of debate have been sharply drawn in recent
years concerning the application of the public trust doctrine to
prior appropriators.12 The protagonists in this debate have sel-
dom considered the relevance of the doctrine to water quality
11. Over the past 15 years, in half the states, over 100 reported cases involv-
ing the public trust doctrine have had a major impact on natural resources protec-
tion. Only a few of these cases, however, deal directly with nonpoint pollution.
Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Re-
sources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 643-44
(1986).
12. Sources generally supporting the public trust doctrine include H. Dun-
ning, Instream Flows, the Public Trust, and the Future of the West, presented at
Instream Flow Protection in the Western United States: A Practical Symposium,
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1988)
(conference proceedings available from the Natural Resources Law Center, Uni-
versity of Colorado) [hereinafter H. Dunning, Instream Flows]; Dunning, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1984) [hereinafter Dunning, Discord or Harmony?]; John-
son, The Emerging Recognition of a Public Interest in Water: Water Quality
Control by the Public Trust Doctrine in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 127 (D.
Getches ed. 1988); Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake
Levels, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 233 (1980) [hereinafter Johnson, Public Trust Pro-
tection]; Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Ju-
dicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Wilkinson, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 269 (1980).
A recent study by the Western States Water Council expressed an opposing
view: "[Tihe majority view, indeed what many would call the settled law in the
West, is that because vested water rights are constitutionally protected property
interests they are not subject to modification unless expressly conditioned." WEST-
ERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION AND THE
CHANGING WEST 24 (1987).
Authors generally critical of the public trust doctrine, often on the ground
that it thwarts legitimate investment-backed expectations, include: Ausness,
Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407; Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A
Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning,
and Johnson, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 565 (1986); Lazarus, supra note 11 (an especially
comprehensive and well researched article); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine
in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982). For an excellent transcribed oral discussion of the pros
and cons of the issues, see comments by Adolph Moskovitz, Harrison Dunning,
and Clifford Lee in PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM, DEP'T OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE, U.C.L.A. EXTENSION, MONO LAKE: BEYOND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 77-96
(March 30-31, 1984, conference proceedings).
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control, which is the main focus of this Article.
From the beginning, the public trust doctrine has protected
navigation, commerce, and fisheries. Protection of fisheries neces-
sarily implies protection of water quality, but in recent years,
courts have increasingly identified water quality as a separate or
specific, rather than derivative, interest protected by the public
trust doctrine."3 This doctrine now provides a principled com-
mon-law theory for protecting water quality, especially against
nonpoint pollution.
Because states and their subdivisions can enact zoning laws
regulating land use, so can they enact regulations for controlling
water quality. The law has never recognized a vested property
right to pollute."' Legislatures can prohibit or regulate pollution
with little fear of successful takings claims. At least to the extent
that irrigated agriculture causes pollution, the water rights associ-
ated with that use are subject to regulation.
The prior appropriation system itself can be used to control
nonpoint pollution. This system requires that water be used for a
beneficial purpose. Irrigation that causes pollution presumably
can be regulated under the theory that the term "beneficial use"
means both beneficial to the appropriator and not harmful to the
public. Unfortunately little has been made of this approach to
water quality control."3 Similarly, the requirement that prior ap-
propriation permits be issued only in the "public interest"' 6 has
13. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal.
3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
14. 1 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 1, at 141-42. One water law authority as-
serts that "because water rights are usufructuary rights in a resource that belongs
to the public, it can be argued that no Fifth Amendment taking is involved when
the state decides to reassert its interest or to redefine the nature of private inter-
ests in the use of the resource." D. Getches, Western Water: Flood of Conflicts;
Drought of Solutions 10 (paper presented to Judicial Conference of the 10th Cir-
cuit, Jackson Lake Lodge, Wyoming, July 8, 1988).
15. See C, MEYERS, A, TARLOCK, J. CORBRIDGE, JR. & D. GETCHES, WATER RE-
SOURCE MANAGEMENT 319 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter C. MEYERS] (examples of "ap-
plication of .. .the appropriation doctrine to protect water quality have been
rare.").
16. Numerous western states provide for public interest review before issu-
ance of new prior appropriation permits. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-152,
-153 (1987); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1225, 2155 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 46-233, -234, -235 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 46-1-15, -2A-9, -5-
10, -6-3 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.250, .03.290, .44.060 (1962 & Supp.
[Vol. 19:485
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not been effective to protect public trust interests. The definition
of public interest is too vague to alter the inertia of the adminis-
trative practice to issue appropriation permits to all who apply.
Historically, the prior appropriation system has allocated
water in all of the seventeen arid Western States. The doctrine
originated as a common-law doctrine in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, and most state legislatures codified it around the turn of the
century. Its declared policy is that "first in time is first in right."
For example, A diverts and puts to beneficial use water from a
stream before B, thus vesting A with a permanent, legal property
right to continue the diversion forever, although A must make a
beneficial use of the water and has no right to waste it. A need
not share her water rights with B in time of drought. If the water
level drops, B may be totally deprived of water, but A will get her
full appropriation.
During the West's early economic development, the prior ap-
propriation system served exceedingly well, encouraging farming,
mining, and industrial activities. In fact, prior appropriation has
been so important to western development and so dear to agricul-
tural water users (whose land would often be worthless without
water), that the doctrine has become cloaked in a powerful mys-
tique; a mystique so strong that it deters analysis of the true
scope, limits, and purpose of the doctrine.
Until the 1950s and 1960s there was little reason to study or
write about the scope or limits of the prior appropriation doc-
trine. Competing uses were relatively few, and appropriators only
occasionally used enough water to impair public trust interests. If
a stream was overused, the public could go to other rivers or lakes
for recreation or wildlife enhancement. The prevalent myth of the
time was that the prior appropriation system was totally compre-
hensive,17 was fair to everyone, and took precedence over other
claims to water use.s The prior appropriation system, however,
1988).
17. Getches discusses this notion in a recent article where he says that "(tihe
prior appropriation doctrine was considered sufficient to allocate and reallocate
water resources with little guidance." Getches, Water Planning in the West: Un-
tapped Opportunity for the Western States, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 1, 25 (1988).
18. The respected Justice Mathew W. Hill of the Washington Supreme Court
expressed this general view in In re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218
P.2d 309 (1950). He argued that the appropriation code made swimming, fishing,
19891
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was and is a special interest doctrine designed to establish rules
for surface water allocation among prior appropriators. It was not
designed to control other resources such as groundwater, or other
uses such as the discharge of wastes, boating, swimming, or fish-
ing. It was not designed to affect public trust interests such as
navigation, fishing, recreation, environmental quality, water qual-
ity control, or other in-stream flow interests.
Why rely on the public trust doctrine for nonpoint pollution
control when the nation has a comprehensive national water pol-
lution control system in place? The answer is that the national
system has been ineffective in controlling nonpoint pollution.19
In 1972, when Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act 2 0 and took over from the states the nation's water
quality control program, optimists thought the nation had the
pollution problem under control. Point sources were specifically
controlled. Nonpoint sources were to be investigated by the states
under section 208 and presumably would be controlled soon. Im-
plementation of section 208, however, fell flat. 1 Nonpoint source
and boating secondary to the rights of appropriators. He did not contend that
riparians had to apply for permits under the code to exercise such rights, but
rather that the state became the owner of public waters by the appropriation
code, that appropriators were given a priority status under the act, and that swim-
ming, fishing, and boating were privileges allowed only by consent of the state and
were subject to loss when in conflict with appropriative rights. Id. at 294-301, 218
P.2d at 315-19 (Hill, J., dissenting).
19. "Nonpoint source pollution is primarily responsible for the wholesale vio-
lation of water quality standards found in virtually all states .... It is an accurate
supposition that nonpoint sources are exempted from the regulatory reach of the
Clean Water Act." 2 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 1, at 125. "[T]here has been no
uniform regulatory control over nonpoint sources .... Many of the 208 plans that
were prepared emphasized a period of further study .... [Tihe reassessment time
arrived without significant comprehensive state plans being put into effect and
little progress having been made toward general abatement of nonpoint source
pollution, particularly from agriculture ... 3 R. BECK & C. GOPLERUD, WATER
AND WATER RIGHTS 282-83 (3d ed. 1988).
20. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). In 1977, the Act was
substantially amended and the name of the act was changed to the Clean Water
Act. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1567 (1977).
21. "[L]ittle progress [has] been made [under the 1972 Act] toward general
abatement of nonpoint source pollution, particularly from agriculture and for-
estry." R. BECK & C. GOPLERUD, supra note 19, at 283. The regulatory attention
which has been given to point sources of pollution over the past near decade and a
half-with a substantial degree of success-has not focused nearly so sharply on
nonpoint sources.... [Agriculture, silviculture, and other nonpoint sources] have
[Vol. 19:485
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pollution, especially that generated by agriculture, has grown
apace, essentially uncontrolled.22 Now we have section 1329 of the
1987 Amendments" calling for still more study and conferences
on nonpoint pollution, eventually aimed at providing some con-
trol. Meanwhile, agricultural and other nonpoint pollution
problems worsen.24 Not surprisingly, the courts are being asked to
plug this gap in the nation's pollution control program, often with
the public trust doctrine.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine originated from the widespread
practice, from time immemorial, of using navigable waters as pub-
lic highways and fishing grounds.2 5 The Institutes of Justinian
proclaimed that the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the seashores, are common to all by natural law.2 Professor Jo-
one thing in common: they are not amenable to the usual end-of-the-pipe control
strategies. All too often, therefore, they have gone without adequate regulation." 2
J. BATTLE, supra note 5, at 213.
22. Only point sources are regulated by the Clean Water Act. The definition
of point sources has been narrowed to exclude from regulation agricultural storm
water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1362(14) (West Supp. 1988); see C. MEYERS, supra note 15, at 320.
23. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1329 (West Supp. 1988).
24. See E. NIELSON & L. LEE, supra note 7, at 2. California farmers, the larg-
est users of pesticides in the United States, apply 480 million pounds of insecti-
cides, fungicides, and herbicides each year. Olsenius, Soil Erosion, Agrichemicals
and Water Quality: A Need for a New Conservation Ethic? in WATER QUALITY
CONTROL: INTEGRATING BENEFICIAL USE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 11 (June
1-3, 1988, conference proceedings) (available from the University of Colorado
School of Law Natural Resources Law Center). Between 1966 and 1981, Iowa, Ne-
braska, and Minnesota increased herbicide use alone by 175 percent. Id. In the
United States as a whole, agriculture uses about 1.1 billion pounds of pesticides
yearly. Id. Agricultural nonpoint source pollution has been reported as a moderate
to severe problem in 36 states. Id. at 10. "The most telling example of uncon-
trolled pollution is the so-called 'non-point source.' . . . Indeed, non-point sources
are the most pervasive source of pollution nationwide." C. MEYERS, supra note 15,
at 320.
25. On the history of the public trust doctrine, see Cohen, The Constitution,
the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388; Dun-
ning, Discord or Harmony?, supra note 12; Sax, supra note 12; Selvin, The Public
Trust Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789-1920, 1980 WIs. L.
REV. 1403; Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes
the People's Environmental Rights, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980).
26. J. INsT. 2.1.1. The Institutes of Justinian, a general textbook of Roman
19891
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seph Sax, in his original article on the public trust doctrine,
wrote,
First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought
to be preserved for the benefit of the public; accordingly, property
used for those purposes was distinguished from general public
property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private own-
ers. Second, while it was understood that in certain common
properties-such as seashores, highways, and running
water-"perpetual use was dedicated to the public," it has never
been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent
infringement of these interests.27
In the United States, three of the most frequently cited early
cases are Arnold v. Mundy,'8 decided in 1821, Martin v. Wad-
dell,2" decided in 1842, and Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,30
decided in 1892. In Mundy, the New Jersey Supreme Court an-
nounced an expansive doctrine, stating:
[B]y the law of nature... the civil law... the common law.., the
navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the
bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land
under the water, for the purposes of passing and repassing, naviga-
tion, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all other uses of the water
and its products ... are common to all the citizens.2 '
In Martin v. Waddell, the United States Supreme Court said
that the "shores, and rivers, and bays, and arms of the sea, and
the land under them [were held] as a public trust for the benefit
of the whole community, to be freely used by all for navigation
and fishery, as well for shell-fish as floating fish."32 In Illinois
Central, the Court said that the title to beds of navigable water is
"held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interfer-
law, was issued around 533 A.D. AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY 172 (W.
Langer rev. ed. 1952).
27. Sax, supra note 12, at 475 (quoting W. HUNTER, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN
LAW, 311 (4th ed. 1903)).
28. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
30. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
31. 6 N.J.L. at 76-77 (emphasis added).
32. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 413.
[Vol. 19:485
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ence of private parties. ' '3 3
III. THE WATERS AND LANDS COVERED BY THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
In England, the public trust doctrine covered only waters
where the tide ebbed and flowed. The United States, in contrast,
has large navigable rivers like the Mississippi and the Columbia
flowing inland for hundreds of miles. Not surprisingly, United
States courts extended the doctrine to cover navigable fresh wa-
ters; the doctrine covers all waters that are "navigable in fact,"
whether fresh or salt.8 ' Several western states have recognized
public rights of navigation on waters that are not commercially
navigable but are navigable for pleasure craft only.3 5
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the Mono
Lake case), the California Supreme Court held that the doctrine
applied to nonnavigable tributaries, citing the potentially adverse
impacts of extractions on navigable Mono Lake. While various
33. 146 U.S. at 452. In 1869, the Illinois Legislature conveyed the bed of Lake
Michigan in the Chicago harbor to the Illinois Central Railroad. Four years later
the legislature repealed the grant. The Supreme Court held the legislative repeal
valid under the public trust doctrine.
34. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
35. See People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403,
157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1979); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55
Cal. App. 3d 560, 127 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976); People v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040,
97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684
P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d
163 (Mont. 1984); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961). For an earlier
case, see Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 257, 145 N.W. 816 (1914). For
a case that required comprehensive planning before new appropriation permits
were issued, even on nonnavigable-for-title waters, see United Plainsmen Ass'n v.
North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976). In
1987, the Oregon Legislature enacted two statutes that apply the public trust doc-
trine to all waters of the state. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.336, .460 (1987). See also
Johnson, Public Trust Protection, supra note 12, where the author argues that if
the public trust doctrine is viewed in a functional sense, the doctrine supports
decisions protecting riparian rights to lake and stream levels against extractors,
navigational servitude cases, and cases upholding the public right to use the sur-
face of nonnavigable-for-title water bodies.
36. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 436, 658 P.2d 709, 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 357, cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). Under the equal footing doctrine, each new state enter-
ing the Union automatically acquired title to the beds of waters that were then
navigable under the federal test. The title to the beds of waters that were non-
19891
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cases have held that the public has an easement to use the sur-
face of small, nonnavigable waters where the bed is privately
owned, no case has yet held that the public trust doctrine limits
withdrawals from nonnavigable-for-title streams where the only
impact is upon the nonnavigable body of water.37 Courts, how-
ever, have stopped appropriations from nonnavigable-for-title
lakes or have awarded damages where the extractions harmed ri-
parians.'5 The Idaho Supreme Court has said that the doctrine
applies to all waters of the state.39 Recent Oregon legislation40 as
well as cases in Hawaii,4' Montana,"' and New Jersey,43 appear to
navigable remained in federal ownership under this doctrine and ordinarily passed
later to homesteaders.
37. In Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 199
Cal. App. 3d 402, 405, 244 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833 (1988), the California Court of Ap-
peals held that the public trust doctrine in California applied only to navigable
waters and their tributaries, and did not apply to a reservoir.
38. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Aitken, 10 Cal. App. 2d 460, 52 P.2d 585
(1935); In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
39. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985). The court said, "The
state holds all waters in trust for the benefit of the public, and 'does not have the
power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties.' " Id. at 336 n.2,
707 P.2d at 447 n.2 (quoting Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club,
105 Idaho 622, 625, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983)). The public trust, the court said,
protects the public interest in "property values, 'navigation, fish and wildlife
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality.' " Id. at 337
n.2, 707 P.2d at 448 n.2 (quoting Kootenai, 105 Idaho at 632, 671 P.2d at 1095).
This holding has been codified at IDAHO CODE § 36-1601 (1977).
Clyde Martz says, of the Colorado Constitution,
The state should assume and exercise the trust responsibility placed on it
under article XVI, section 5 of the [Colorado] constitution to administer
the allocations of available water among those entitled to it with maximum
efficiency, maximum protection of vested rights and minimum costs im-
posed on the public. No clearer public trust language can be found than
that in section 5 of the Colorado constitution, dedicating the water of every
natural stream to the use of the people of the state.
C. Martz, The Groundwater Resource, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 95 (D.
Getches ed. 1988). Nevertheless, in In re Application for Water Rights of the City
of Aurora, No. 86-CW-37, slip op. at 2 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Water Div. 4, May 5, 1988),
Judge Robert A. Brown denied that "public trust" interests, or "public interests"
(which he concluded were the same) could be considered by a Colorado court
when the court is evaluating the respective applications for conditional water
rights. Judge Brown mistakenly believed that the public trust doctrine applies
only in states recognizing the riparian rights doctrine. Id.
40. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.332, .455 (1987).
41. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641, 673-77, 658 P.2d 287, 310-12 (1982).
42. Gait v. Montana Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915
[Vol. 19:485
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take the same position.
Several states have applied the public trust doctrine to up-
land areas. In New Jersey the doctrine covers dry sand above high
tide."' Montana includes portages over private lands to get
around obstacles or dangerous rapids in streams.' In Massachu-
setts the doctrine covers wetlands and state parks.46 Professor
Charles Wilkinson, in his seminal article on the public trust doc-
trine in public land law, concludes that the doctrine has gone be-
yond its original water based scope and now applies to public
lands with special importance for the health, welfare, and safety
of the public.47
IV. THE INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The classic list of protected interests includes commerce,
navigation, and fisheries.4' Thus, not only are the underlying beds
protected,'49 but the waters5" and fisheries are also protected."'
This in itself is quite broad because protection of fisheries neces-
sarily includes protection of water quality. Even from early days,
however, the interests protected have been stated more broadly.
(Mont. 1987).
43. Mayor & Mun. Council of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 224
N.J. Super. 53, 539 A.2d 760 (1987). The court held that the public trust doctrine
applied to the control of drinking water because "adequate supplies of wholesome
water are essential to the health, welfare, commerce and prosperity of the people
of the state." Id. at 64, 539 A.2d at 765 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:22-2(a) (West
1982)).
44. Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(1972).
45. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont.
1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
46. Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577
(1969).
47. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 269 (1980).
48. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
49. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 (1963); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
50. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 207 & n.25 (R. Clark ed. 1967) (citing,
among 17 United States Supreme Court cases, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876)).
51. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240
(1891); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
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In Arnold v. Mundy,"2 the New Jersey Supreme Court included
"fishing, fowling, sustenance and all other uses of the water and
its products. 5 3 Recent cases have explicitly stated that other in-
terests are protected. In Marks v. Whitney,"4 the California Su-
preme Court gave extensive treatment to this issue, stating:
Public trust easements are traditionally defined in terms of
navigation, commerce and fisheries. They have been held to include
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating and general
recreation purposes . . .and to use the bottom of the navigable
waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes....
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently
flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the
trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification
favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is a growing
public recognition that one of the most important public uses of
the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is
the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they
may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of
the area. It is not necessary to here define precisely all the public
uses which encumber tidelands.55
A critical question is whether water quality is one of the in-
terests protected by the public trust doctrine. While Marks v.
Whitney does not list water quality control as a protected inter-
est in so many words, it clearly is included within the terms "fish-
eries" and "food and habitat for marine life." Other recent cases,
such as the 1987 Washington Supreme Court decision, Caminiti
v. Boyle,"6 refer to the public rights of fishing, boating, swimming,
water skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally re-
garded as corollary to the right of navigation and the use of pub-
lic waters.5 7 In Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle
52. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
53. Id. at 12.
54. 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
55. Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796 (citations omitted)
quoted in National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 33 Cal. 3d 419,
434, 658 P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
56. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 732 P.2d 989 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 703 (1988).
57. This language originally appeared in Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d
306, 316, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970). In Orion Corp. v.
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Yacht Club,68 the Idaho Supreme Court said that the doctrine
protected property values, "navigation, fish and wildlife habitat,
aquatic life, recreation aesthetic beauty and water quality." 59 The
1987 Oregon Legislature enacted two statutes indicating that the
public trust doctrine covers water quality. 0 One of these statutes
provides that the public trust covers recreation, protection and
enhancement of fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat, and
any other ecological values, pollution abatement, navigation,
scenic attraction, and other similar or related uses protected by
the public trust.61
In Mono Lake, the California Supreme Court, in addition to
approving the Marks v. Whitney array of protected interests,
stated that one reason for restraining the Los Angeles diversion
was to keep Mono Lake's salinity from increasing. This would
cause the algae to die, which in turn would reduce the numbers of
brine shrimp and brine flies that feed on the algae. The end result
would be damage to the brine shrimp industry, and a reduction in
the gull population, which is dependent upon the brine shrimp.2
The court effectively ruled that water quality is one of the inter-
ests protected by the public trust doctrine.6 3
In United States v. State Water Resources Control Board,64
the California Court of Appeal held that under Mono Lake, the
California Water Board could modify existing appropriation per-
mits under the public trust doctrine, "in order to protect fish and
Washington, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996
(1988), the Washington Supreme Court noted that another court had held that
the "public trust protects ecological values and [the] right to preserve tidelands in
[their] natural state." Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10 (citing Marks v.
Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971)). The court pointed
out that this extension of the public trust doctrine allowed a state to "claim dam-
ages for killing of waterfowl by oil spill." Id. at 641 n.10, 747 P.2d at 1073 n.10
(citing In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980)). An oil spill, of
course, is a form of pollution. The Orion court added that "[riesolution of this
case does not require us to decide the total scope of the doctrine." Id.
58. 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
59. Id. at 632, 671 P.2d at 1095; see also Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707
P.2d 441 (1985) (considering the statutory public interest factors).
60. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.336, .460 (1987).
61. Id. § 537.460.
62. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 430, 658 P.2d. 709, 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 352, cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
63. 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
64. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
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wildlife" from pollution and excessive saltwater intrusion from
the sea."
While the public trust doctrine has seldom been used explic-
itly to protect water quality, if it is to protect fish, wildlife, recre-
ational, and environmental values, it must encompass water qual-
ity. As the California court stated in State Water Resources
Control Board, although Congress in 1972 enacted what is now
called the Clean Water Act, that law does not purport to control
salt water intrusion, nor is it yet effective in controlling nonpoint
pollution generated by irrigation return flow. 6s
V. STATE POWERS TO CONVEY AWAY PUBLIC TRUST RESOURCES,
OR TO DESTROY PUBLIC TRUST INTERESTS
Ever since the 1892 Illinois Central case, courts have gener-
ally held that legislatures have the power to destroy public trust
interests by legislative action. 7 For legislation to accomplish this,
the legislative intent must be either express or sufficiently clear."
65. Id. at 150, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
66. Id. at 173, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 108; see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, 1362(19)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
67. In Illinois Central, the Supreme Court stated that grants of land bur-
dened by the public trust would be justified if occupation did "not substantially
impair the public interests in the lands and waters remaining," or if the public
interest in navigation and commerce is improved. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
68. In City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162
Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) and Robbins v. Department of
Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969), California and Massachu-
setts courts said that public trust interests could be destroyed, but only by express
legislative action-action by the legislature that indicated that it realized exactly
what it was doing with these resources. In Mono Lake, the California Supreme
Court referred to Berkeley and stated, "[W]e held that the grantees' title was
subject to the trust, both because the Legislature had not made clear its intention
to authorize a conveyance free of the trust and because the 1870 act and the con-
veyances under it were not intended to further trust purposes." 33 Cal. 3d at 439,
658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360. The Berkeley court also stated that
"[sltatutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the
intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and if any
interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain the public's
interest in tidelands, the court must give the statute such an interpretation." 26
Cal. 3d at 528, 606 P.2d at 369, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 334; see also Amigos de Bolsa
Chica v. Signal Properties, 190 Cal. Rptr. 798, 808 (1983).
One respected author points out that in California, because extinction of pub-
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Significantly, in Mono Lake, the California Supreme Court
held that the 1913 Water Commission Act69 (California's basic ap-
propriation code), and appropriation permits issued in 1940
under that code to the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power (DWP) to extract water from tributaries to Mono Lake for
domestic use in Los Angeles, did not terminate the public trust
interests in Mono Lake.7" The California Water Board, in issuing
the 1940 permits, explicitly stated that it had "no choice" but to
grant the applications, despite the harm that would occur to the
lake. The Board said:
It is indeed unfortunate that the City's proposed development will
result in decreasing the aesthetic advantages of Mono Basin but
there is apparently nothing this office can do to prevent it. The use
to which the City proposes to put the water under its Applications
[domestic use] . .. is defined by the Water Commission Act as the
highest to which the water may be applied .... This office there-
fore has no alternative but to dismiss all protests based upon the
possible lowering of the water level in Mono Lake and the effect
that the diversion of water from these streams may have upon the
aesthetic and recreational value of the Basin.7"
In 1982, when reviewing the Water Board's 1940 decision, the
California Supreme Court said:
The water rights enjoyed by DWP were granted, the diversion
was commenced, and has continued to the present without any
lic trust interests cannot occur even by way of explicit legislative mandate unless
certain conditions are met, the doctrine takes on the dimensions of an implied
constitutional limitation upon legislative power. H. Dunning, Instream Flows,
supra note 12. Dunning relies on language from Mono Lake to the effect that the
state may surrender public trust protection "only in rare cases when the abandon-
ment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust." 33 Cal. 3d at 441,
658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361. Dunning also cites People ex rel. Scott v.
Chicago Park Dist., 66 Ill. 2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976); see also Amigos de Bolsa
Chica, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 808; Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co.,
93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896), aff'd, 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W. 780 (1899).
Professor Harrison C. Dunning continues to write well-reasoned, carefully
documented updates on the public trust doctrine in California. Dunning, Discord
or Harmony?, supra note 12; H. Dunning, Instream Flows, supra note 12; Dun-
ning, The Mono Lake Decision: Protecting a Common Heritage Resource from
Death by Diversion, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,144 (1983).
69. Water Commission Act of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 592.
70. 33 Cal. 3d at 447-48, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
71. Id. at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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consideration of the impact upon the public trust. An objective
study and reconsideration of the water rights in the Mono Basin is
long overdue. The water law of California-which we conceive to
be an integration including both the public trust doctrine and the
Board-administered appropriative rights system-permits such a
reconsideration; the values underlying that integration require itJ 2
The court later added:
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust
imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of
the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allo-
cate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined
by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of cur-
rent knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.73
The California court did not believe that the 1913 Code and the
permits issued under it were sufficiently clear to destroy the pub-
lic trust interest in Mono Lake.
74
The California court could have reached the result it reached
in Mono Lake by relying on the antiwaste and reasonableness re-
quirements of article 14, section 3 of the California Constitution
or by the beneficial use element of the prior appropriation sys-
tem,75 but the court chose to rely on the public trust doctrine
72. Id. at 426, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The Mono Lake court
went even further in dicta. "The state accordingly has the power to reconsider
allocation decisions even though those decisions were made after due considera-
tion of their effect on the public trust." Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr
at 365. See also Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist.,
199 Cal. 3d 402, 244 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1988).
73. 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365. Alaska and Idaho
courts recently cited the Mono Lake decision with approval. See CWC Fisheries,
Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhan-
dle Yacht Club, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
74. The California Supreme Court sent Mono Lake back to the trial court for
allocation of the waters of the tributaries to Mono Lake, consistent with the
court's opinion.
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court held that the California public
trust doctrine did not apply to property that originally came from Mexican land
grants where the owner's title had been confirmed in federal patent proceedings
without any mention of the public trust doctrine, and where, by federal statute,
the validity of the titles was to be decided according to Mexican law. Summa
Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984).
75. The definition of beneficial use has generally been left to the courts. As a
common-law concept, it is subject to redefinition as society's needs change.
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instead.
The Mono Lake court apparently did not believe it was ex-
panding the scope of the public trust doctrine. The court stated
that " '[i]f the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills
which destroy navigation and other public trust uses in navigable
waters, it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of
water that destroys navigation and other public interests. Both
actions result in the same damage to the public interest.' s76
Equally persuasive is the argument that extractions by ap-
propriators that degrade water quality and thus harm fish, wild-
life, recreational opportunities, or environmental values, should
also be constrained by the public trust doctrine. Again, the im-
pact of water quality degradation on these public trust values is
no different from the impact of a fill that damages these same
values.
Prior to Mono Lake, no court had applied the public trust
doctrine to the allocation of water between the public and an ap-
propriator or riparian. In a 1976 decision, United Plainsmen As-
sociation v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commis-
sion,77 the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized the
relationship between the two doctrines. The court enjoined issu-
ance of an appropriation permit for a large water project until the
state water agency completed a comprehensive plan that took ac-
count of the impact of such projects on the public trust interests
of commerce, navigation, and fisheries. The court stated that the
public trust doctrine applied to the allocation of water under the
appropriation system.7
8
VI. THE LIMITED SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE PRIOR
APPROPRIATION SYSTEM
One of the salient features of the appropriation system is
that, in its formative period, it took little account of water quality
degradation. Pollution was not a problem during the development
of the doctrine, so little attention was paid to it. Individual ap-
propriators seldom contributed significantly to pollution.
76. 33 Cal. 3d at 436-37, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Johnson, Public Trust Protection, supra note 12, at 256-57).
77. 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
78. Id. at 463.
1989]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Today, the prior appropriation system is recognized as a spe-
cial interest legal doctrine, and as a major cause of pollution in
the West. The system was designed as a means of allocating water
among appropriators, and was not intended to allocate water vis-
A-vis other uses. It was not designed to include public trust inter-
ests such as water quality. One reason the water quality problem
has become so serious is because water was made available with-
out cost to appropriators. This encouraged, and continues to en-
courage, profligate use of this valuable resource, which in turn
causes pollution to worsen.
Most western states codified the common-law appropriation
doctrine in the late 1800s or early 1900s.' An examination of a
typical western appropriation code, Washington's 1917 Water
Code, illustrates their limited nature. The Washington Code
starts with a statement that appears to be totally comprehensive:
"[Alt water within the state belongs to the public, and any right
thereto, or to the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by
appropriation for a beneficial use and in the manner provided
[herein] and not otherwise ..... ,,o One would assume from this
exceptionally broad language that the Code covered the allocation
of underground water, the use of water for waste disposal, and the
use of water for swimming, fishing, boating, or anything else, but
that is not the case.
In 1945, the Washington Legislature, deeming that the Code
was intended to cover only surface waters and not groundwater,
enacted a groundwater code to fill this gap and provide a statu-
tory groundwater allocation method.81 It also became apparent in
the 1940s that the Water Code did not cover waste discharges
into public waters (certainly a use of these waters), so in 1945 the
legislature enacted a water pollution control code.2 In addition,
the Washington Supreme Court held early on that the 1917
Water Code did not cover uses for swimming, boating, or fish-
ing.8 3 In fact, in case of conflict, these common-law riparian uses
79. See 3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN
STATES (1977).
80. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (1962) (emphasis added).
81. Act approved Mar. 19, 1945, ch. 263, 1945 Wash. Laws 826 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.44.010-.900 (1962 & Supp. 1988)).
82. Act approved Mar. 16, 1945, ch. 216, 1945 Wash. Laws 608 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.010-.910 (1962 & Supp. 1988)).
83. See In re Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309 (1950);
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prevailed over appropriative claims, at least as to lake levels. The
court held that if an appropriation interfered with certain ripa-
rian rights, specifically the right to lake levels, the riparian land-
owner prevailed."
Examination of appropriation codes in other states reveals
provisions similar to those in the Washington Code, especially re-
garding pollution control,85 groundwater,86 and swimming, boat-
ing, and fishing.8 7 This experience teaches that the prior appro-
priation codes and doctrine, although customarily cast in all-
encompassing terms, were in fact vehicles to allocate water be-
tween and among appropriators. The codes were not designed to
cover groundwater, waste discharges, fishing, rights to surface use,
nor public trust interests.
Nothing in the appropriation doctrine either explicitly or im-
plicitly purports to cover public trust values. While recent
amendments to some water codes consider these values,88 this leg-
islation is contemporary and does not alter the historical fact that
neither the common-law prior appropriation doctrine nor the leg-
islation codifying that doctrine took account of public trust inter-
ests. Public trust interests are still alive and well, and can prop-
erly be recognized and implemented by courts and legislatures.
Martha Lake Water Co. v. Nelson, 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
84. Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382; see also In re Clinton
Water Dist., 36 Wash. 2d 284, 218 P.2d 309; Litka v. Anacortes, 167 Wash. 259, 9
P.2d 88 (1932).
85. Several pollution control codes were enacted in the post-war era. See, e.g.,
Act of Mar. 16, 1967, ch. 106, 1967 Ariz. Sess. Laws 534; Dickey Water Pollution
Control Act, ch. 1549, 1949 Cal. Stat. 2782; Colorado Water Pollution Control Act
of 1966, ch. 44, 1966 Colo. Sess. Laws 199; Act of Feb. 28, 1967, ch. 197, §§ 121-
139, 1967 Mont. Laws 466, 500-07; Water Quality Act, ch. 190, 1967, N.M. Laws
1109; Act of Dec. 1, 1938, ch. 3, 1939 Or. Laws 9.
86. See generally 3 W. HUTCHINS, supra note 79.
87. See Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on West-
ern Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1967).
88. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE, § 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989) (enacted
1959); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.22, .54 (Supp. 1988) (enacted 1969 and 1971).
See generally Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Pro-
gress Report on the 'New' Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211.
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VII. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PRIOR APPROPRIATORS AND THE
PUBLIC OVER THE RIGHT TO CONTROL WATER QUALITY
Until recently the prior appropriation doctrine and the pub-
lic trust doctrine operated entirely independent of each other.
They are now being brought into contact, and conflict. The prior
appropriation system is based on the assumption that an appro-
priator obtains a vested, legal property right to public waters by
extracting and using these waters for beneficial purposes. Taking
this right away or unduly regulating it entitles the owner to
compensation.
The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, is based on the
proposition that polluters do not acquire vested property rights
by their past history of water use for waste disposal, and state
laws prohibiting or regulating pollution seldom give rise to consti-
tutional takings challenges. 9 Cases have, for example, upheld the
constitutionality of the Clean Water Act, which had as its 1985
goal elimination of all waste discharges into public waters and re-
turn of these waters to their natural state.90
One would assume that industries that had historically de-
posited wastes into public rivers and streams would often have
claimed a vested property right to continue doing so, and that
they were entitled to compensation if that right was taken away,
but there is a dearth of such cases. Environmental pollution law
casebooks have neither sections nor cases on such constitutional
questions, because the rule is clear that no issue is raised. No one
has a constitutionally protected right to deposit wastes into or
otherwise pollute public waters.
What happens when these two streams of jurisprudence are
connected? In a case where the state takes a water right from
prior appropriator A and gives it to B, then a potential takings
question arises. Similarly, a takings argument might be raised if
the state takes a water right from A and puts it back into the
common pool, although such action is arguably within the state's
power as trustee of a public resource. The test of taking in these
cases is whether the state regulation "goes too far," or meets
89. See 2 W. RODGERS, JR., supra note 1, at 620-23; R. BECK & C. GOPLERUD,
supra note 19.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317,
1325-29 (6th Cir. 1974).
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other constitutional takings standards. If the state regulates or
even bans A's irrigation to protect water quality under the public
trust doctrine, however, no takings claim is justified. One can ar-
rive at the same result using only the state police power. No one
can acquire a vested property right to pollute public waters.
Thus, police power regulation or prohibition of pollution does not
raise takings issues.
Thus, the problem can be approached two ways. First, the
public trust doctrine protects water quality. The public trust doc-
trine antedates the prior appropriation system. Under the ease-
ment imposed by this doctrine, no one can acquire a pollution
right that violates trust interests. Second, no one can acquire a
constitutionally protected, vested property right to pollute that
can stand against the state police power. Thus, polluters can be
regulated, or banned, at the will of the legislature.
What is fascinating, even a bit mysterious, is that these three
lines of jurisprudence, the public trust doctrine, the police power,
and the prior appropriation system, have existed for many years
and have seldom intersected. Now, because of intense competi-
tion for increasingly limited water resources, they are meeting,
and sometimes conflicting.
When these doctrines come into conflict, as they did in Mono
Lake, the public trust doctrine should prevail. The states, in
granting property rights to prior appropriators, never considered
the eventual impact of this system on water quality, and never
intended, explicitly or otherwise, to convey away governmental
power to control water pollution through the public trust doctrine
or police power regulation."'
Prior appropriators might claim that their appropriation per-
mits implicitly include a right to cause incidental pollution. Such
an argument might be persuasive against other appropriators, but
not the public. The public always has the right to control pollu-
tion. All waste dischargers into public waters are subject to con-
trol. A polluter may, under various state or federal pollution con-
trol systems, acquire a license to discharge wastes into public
water for a time, but that license is revocable. It is not the vested
91. The defect in the vested rights view is that it looks at only one side of a
two-sided coin; it looks strictly at water quantity and neglects the water quality
side.
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property right claimed by appropriators.
Today, almost all extractions of water contribute to water
quality degradation by reducing the quantity of water in streams,
causing temperature changes and reducing the assimilative capac-
ity. Extractions also result in return flows containing natural
salts, selenium, and other chemicals leached from the soil, which
cumulatively affect water quality and carry pesticides, herbicides,
fertilizers, and other polluting agents.92 Individual extractions, al-
though not necessarily significant in themselves, cumulatively de-
grade water quality. Individual actions that cumulatively cause
pollution are clearly proper subjects of regulation or prohibition.
The San Francisco Bay delta problem demonstrates the pol-
lution caused by the cumulative impact of many water withdraw-
als. " Extractions of water reduce freshwater pressure and allow
salt water from the bay to intrude into the delta, causing harm to
fish, wildlife, and other water uses.
The Kesterson Wildlife Refuge in central California dramati-
cally illustrates the effects of accumulated pollutants in return
flows.94 Irrigation leaches natural selenium from the soils on sev-
eral large farms served by a federal reclamation project. The
chemical then concentrates in irrigation return flows collected in
drainage canals that flow into the wildlife refuge where the con-
taminated water kills wildlife. Refuge employees attempt to scare
away birds so they will not land and be poisoned.
The Colorado River is burdened with a serious salinity prob-
lem."' The many irrigation projects along the river, especially the
Wellton-Mohawk project, all contribute to this problem. Exces-
92. Even if one argues that appropriators have a right to extract water that is
not subject to police power regulation, they would still have no right to cause
return flows that create pollution.
93. For a description of this problem, see United States v. State Water Re-
sources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
94. See Norton, The Spiral of Life, WILDERNESS, Spring 1987, at 17, 32-33;
Reffalt, Wetlands in Extremis, WILDERNESS, Winter 1985, at 28-29; Comment,
Tragedy at Kesterson Reservoir: Death of a Wildlife Refuge Illustrates Failings
of Water Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,386 (1985).
95. Friedkin, The International Problem With Mexico Over the Salinity of
the Lower Colorado River, in WATER AND THE AMERICAN WEST 31 (D. Getches ed.
1988) Holburt, International Problems of the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 11 (1975); Johnson, Our Salty Rivers: Legal and Institutional Approaches to
Salinity Management, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 441 (1978).
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sive salinity in the river has caused conflicts with Mexico over the
quality of water passing over the border, and created problems
for downstream users in the United States. Hundreds of other
rivers and streams in the west are polluted by chemicals brought
in by return flows, or by extractions that often totally dry up
these water bodies during the late summer months.
As problems like the San Francisco Bay delta, the Kesterson
Wildlife, Refuge, and the Colorado River multiply, legislatures
and courts will be pressured to restrict and regulate water extrac-
tions under either the public trust doctrine or state police powers.
Examples of controls that might be imposed either by the courts
or legislatures on water extractors under the public trust doctrine
include requiring increased efficiency and greater conservation;
controlling times of day, week, or month for irrigation or other
water uses; regulating the type, composition, and time of applica-
tion of pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals; and restricting
the quantity of water extracted and used by appropriators or ri-
parians. Both Mono Lake and State Water Resources Control
Board essentially adopted this last position. In Mono Lake, the
court was concerned about the increased salinity in Mono Lake
that would result from additional extractions, and the effect that
this would have on the brine shrimp and ultimately on the bird
population.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
WATER QUALITY CONTROL
Application of the public trust doctrine can create problems.
For example, what standards should apply in allocating water
among conflicting users, and which of the existing water users are
to provide the water needed to protect public trust values?
These questions are often raised as virtually insurmountable
obstacles to the equitable application of the public trust doctrine.
A solution is available, however, based on the Clean Water Act's
approach to point sources. Standards could be set, such as "best
practicable technology" or "best management practice." '9 These
would apply to all irrigators or other appropriators similarly situ-
ated. Such standards could require lined instead of dirt ditches,
or sprinkler systems instead of gravity flow irrigation. They might
96. See S. REP. No. 282, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983).
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require irrigation at night, or even the use of less water. These
determinations would ordinarily be made by the state agency ad-
ministering water rights.
IX. POLICE POWER REGULATION
Police power regulation might be used to constrain existing
water extraction rights of either appropriators or riparians. State
regulations designed to protect water quality, recreation, fish and
wildlife, or navigation values, should be upheld against a takings
claim because these activities are already subject to the public
trust. Alternatively, they are subject to the doctrine that there is
no right to pollute. Under this doctrine, legislatures can modify or
ban waste discharge into public waters.
On the other hand, if regulations are not designed to control
pollution, but are designed to increase irrigation efficiency and
make more water available to new users, or for some other pur-
pose not related to pollution control, then the regulations should
receive the same type of analysis as zoning regulations. 7 A sub-
stantial body of jurisprudence exists regarding the constitutional-
ity of zoning regulations. This jurisprudence provides guideposts
on the standards to apply to regulations about appropriators. The
traditional analysis of such regulations is discussed below.
The constitutionality of police power regulations has often
been an issue in zoning and other land use regulation cases. Both
federal and state constitutions are involved in most cases. Be-
cause of the general nature of this Article, primary reference will
be to federal constitutional jurisprudence, although a few widely
cited state cases will be included."
97. For a more detailed analysis of this issue, and a somewhat different per-
spective, see Laitos, Constitutional Limits on Police Power Regulations Affecting
the Exercise of Water Rights, 16 COLO. LAW. 1626 (1987).
98. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
Some of the leading articles on the subject are: Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation'
Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.
J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE
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The seminal test of the constitutionality of land use regula-
tions was enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,ss where
Justice Holmes said the test is whether the regulation "goes too
far."' 00 Fortunately, subsequent cases have supplemented this im-
precise test. For example, in the recent case of Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,"'0 the Court said that a
land use regulation will only be struck down if it "does not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."'02 The Supreme Court
has also said that "[a] statute regulating the uses that can be
made of property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land,' "08 or if it denies the owners "reason-
able 'investment-backed expectations.' "104
The Court has made it clear that mere diminution in value of
the zoned property is not, alone, a sufficient reason to strike down
a zoning ordinance. A 1978 study showed that ordinances dimin-
ishing property values from $1,500,000 to $275,000, from $450,000
to $50,000, and from $65,000 to $5000 were not sufficient to cause
the laws to be held unconstitutional.10 5
The Supreme Court applies a balancing test to determine
whether a regulatory taking has occurred, as evidenced in Key-
stone. This balancing test is reflected in the widely cited Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court case, Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of
Dedham.10 1 In United States v. State Water Resources Control
L. REV. 1057 (1980); Van Aistyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The
Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); see also F.
BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
99. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
100. Id. at 415.
101. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
102. Id. at 485 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980));
see also Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.
103. 480 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981)); see also Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260; Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. 104.
104. 480 U.S. at 499.
105. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1480
(1978).
106. 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973);
see also United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986); Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain
to Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation,
54 WASH. L. REV. 315 (1979).
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Board, the California Supreme Court said:
[A] state regulation that merely restricts a party to the gains rea-
sonably expected from [a] contract does not constitute a substan-
tial impairment [and is not unconstitutional].
Nor is every impairment constitutionally proscribed. Contract
rights, like other property rights, may be altered by the exercise of
the state's inherent police power to safeguard the public welfare..
* "The key inquiry is whether the importance of the state interest
justifies the impairment.M0 7
Police power regulation is not necessarily the only or even
the best action in many circumstances. The Chesapeake Bay ex-
perience, for example, suggests that an array of controls, includ-
ing both economic incentives and regulations, may be the best ap-
proach to solving pervasive, nonpoint source pollution problems.
Chesapeake Bay has been polluted by multiple sources, including
industrial and municipal pollution, farm runoff and irrigation re-
turn flows carrying pesticides, herbicides, and bacterial pollution.
The massive multistate and state-federal cleanup program re-
cently implemented depends primarily on education and eco-
nomic incentives, but also includes regulation of land use and pol-
lution sources. In 1984, the State of Maryland enacted the
Critical Area Act, 0° establishing a permanent commission author-
ized to adopt regulations and establishing criteria and guidelines
to assist local governments in regulating growth and development
within a 1000-foot "critical area" zone surrounding the bay and
its tributaries. 09
If regulatory controls are adopted they might require greater
efficiency in water use; require more conservation, such as lining
ditches; regulate types of crops to be grown; regulate methods or
times of irrigation; regulate the amount of water to be used, or
the times of day, week, or month for irrigation; or regulate the
107. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 146-47, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 199 (1986) (quoting Mo-
bil Oil Corp. v. Rossi, 138 Cal. App. 3d 256, 263, 187 Cal. Rptr. 845, 849 (1982)).
108. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1801 to -1816 (Supp. 1988).
109. In 1985 and 1986, the Maryland Environmental Trust negotiated conser-
vation easements on 2470 acres (eight miles of shoreline) and reduced the permis-
sive population density on these easements from one dwelling unit per five acres
to one unit per 55 acres. Plans were drawn up to preserve forest land in the criti-
cal area. CHESAPEAKE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, SECOND ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT
UNDER THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT 25 (1987).
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types of insecticides, herbicides, and other chemicals that can be
used, and how they are used.
X. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE AND POLICE POWER REGULATION
The major advantage to use of the public trust doctrine is
that it can be the basis of judicial as well as legislative action. If
applied by the courts, the doctrine can sometimes give greater
recognition to public interests at times when legislatures are
under excessive pressure by special interest lobbyists. Neverthe-
less, the doctrine does not have a long and instructive history of
use for water quality control that can assist in predicting its fu-
ture scope and impact. Also, a court may bind only the litigants
before it, rather than an entire industry or activity such as irri-
gated agriculture.
The principal advantage of the police power approach is that
it emanates from a legislative process and therefore can apply
broadly to an entire agricultural activity or industry. Also, such
regulations have a long history of use by legislative bodies and are
thus more familiar to those bodies, as well as to litigants, courts,
and the public. One disadvantage of the police power is that legis-
lative bodies are often subject to excessive pressure by special in-
terest groups, and as a result, provide less-than-adequate protec-
tion to the more diffuse public interests.1 At such times court
decisions often lead the way toward legitimate changes, encourag-
ing legislative bodies to follow with broadly conceived police
power regulations.'
110. For more extensive treatment of this issue, see Sax, supra note 12.
111. An excellent example of this can be seen in the State of Washington.
Bills were introduced in several legislative sessions in Washington to zone and
control development on tidewater and freshwater shorelines in the state. None
passed because of strong opposition by developers and local governments. As
Geoffrey Crooks notes, the ultimate impetus for passage of the Shoreline Manage-
ment Act can be traced to the Washington Supreme Court's decision, Wilbour v.
Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969). Crooks, The Washington Shore-
line Management Act of 1971, 49 WASH. L. REV. 423, 423-25 (1974). That decision
cast doubt on the right of developers to do much of anything on tidewater and
freshwater shorelines without specific authority from a local or state government.
Id. No such permission was possible without enactment of a shoreline manage-
ment act. Suddenly, both developers and the public wanted a shoreline manage-
ment act, albeit not the same one. Id. Such an act was passed shortly thereafter.
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XI. CONCLUSION
The prior appropriation system has served well in the West
and the Nation for 125 years, providing a legal regime that per-
mits and encourages enormous economic growth of agriculture,
industry, and municipalities. This system, however, both in its in-
ception and current application, fails to address or protect public
interests in fisheries, recreation, environmental quality, and clean
water. As a result, serious nonpoint water pollution problems are
occurring throughout the West.
The 1987 amendments to the Federal Clean Water Act pro-
vide for study of the problem and state adoption of plans to re-
solve it. To date, this process has had little impact on water qual-
ity. Three approaches are being considered by states to solve
these water pollution problems. Some states are applying the
public trust doctrine. Some (but only a few) states are adopting
police power regulations to control nonpoint pollution. Others are
approaching the problem through the prior appropriation system
itself, taking the position that beneficial use means use that does
not harm the public through pollution.
The public trust doctrine is not a panacea that will instantly
solve all the conflicts that now surround the prior appropriation
system. It should be considered, however, as a basis for setting
standards such as best practicable technology or best manage-
ment practice.
Control of agricultural nonpoint pollution might be achieved
by education, and possibly by economic incentives, rather than
through the public trust doctrine or police power regulation. In
the final analysis, however, education and economic incentives
may be effective largely because of the existence and potential
threat of the public trust doctrine and police power regulations.
No one-including irrigators, industries, or cities with appro-
priative rights-has a vested, constitutionally protected property
right to degrade the quality of public waters. Thus, pollution con-
trol can be accomplished either under the police power or the
public trust doctrine without becoming derailed by the takings
issue.
The prior appropriation system was born in the 1800s out of
the West's mining and farming needs, and responsive judicial ac-
tivism. It has served the West's needs well over the past century,
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but it was and still is fundamentally a special interest doctrine
designed to allocate water among and between appropriators. It
was never intended to allocate water for in-stream uses or to con-
trol water quality. Both of these interests should now be given
recognition and protection within a more inclusive legal system.
The public trust doctrine provides the vehicle for such
integration.

